References:
Hal Varian: Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Sixth Edition, W.W. Norton & Company, 2003(Teaching Material)
Xinqiao Ping: Eighteen Lectures of Intermediate Microeconomics, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2001
Hal Varian: Microeconomics Analysis, Third Edition, W.W. Norton & Company, 1992
Structure of the Course:
1. Introduction: The Market
2. Budget Constraint and Preferences
3. Utility and Choice
4. Demand
5. Revealed Preference and Slutsky Equation
6. Buying and Selling
7. Intertemporal Choice
8. Asset Markets
9. Uncertainty
10. Consumer's Surplus and Market Demand
11. Equilibrium
12. Technology and Profit Maximization
13. Cost Minimization and Cost Curves
14. MidTerm Examination
15. Firm Supply
16. Industry Supply
17. Monopoly
18. Monopoly Behavior
19. Oligopoly
20. Game Theory
21. Game Applications
22. Exchange
23. Production
24. Externalities
25. Public Goods
26. Asymmetric Information
27. Review
28. Final Examination
Course Objectives:
This course will introduce you the foundations of the analysis of microeconomic decisionmaking, such as the theory of consumer behavior, theory of the firm, and how markets function. This course develops analytical tools to investigate and solve the problems that consumers and firms face. Students will learn analytical methods used in microeconomics, such as graphs, tables, algebra, calculus, and case studies. It is also hoped that that students will be able to apply microeconomic analysis to economic fields, including labor, development, taxation, international trade, etc.
Examination:
Regular attendance, participation, four quizzes, homework: 20%
Mid –Term Test: 40%
Final Test: 40%
Credits & Workload:
4 Credits & 4 hours per Week (teaching) + 2 hours per Week (tutoring); 15 Weeks, 60 hours (teaching) + 30 hours (tutoring)
Excerpt:
Notes of Chapter 20 Game Theory
Nash Equilibrium（NE）: Given other's strategy, nobody has incentive to deviate.
Example 1. Majority Voting
Model setup:
Three voters 1,2 and 3 want to decide whether to vote project a or b.
The Voting process is majority voting.
If project a is passed (two or more than two people agree a), 1,2 and 3 all have payoff 1
If project b is passed, 1,2 and 3 all have payoff 0, in other words, everyone prefer a to b.
What is NEs in this game?
Intuitive explain:
(a, a, a) is obvious, but what about (b, b, b)?
It's a NE too.
Formal solution: Three player's normal form
2 

a 


1 
a 
1, 1,1 
1, 1, 1 

b 
1,1,1 


2 

a 


1 
a 
1,1,1 
0,0,0 

b 
0,0,0 
0,0,0 

Figure1
All NEs in figure 1: (a,a,a), (a,b,a), (b,a,a), (b,b,b), (a,b,b).
Comment: Multiequilibriums exist in example1. NE is not a desirable concept of equilibrium in this case. Sometimes we need to refine the equilibriums: a stronger concept of equilibrium.